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An efficient and secure RSA–like cryptosystem
exploiting Re´dei rational functions over conics
Emanuele Bellini, Nadir Murru
Abstract
We define an isomorphism between the group of points of a conic
and the set of integers modulo a prime equipped with a non-standard
product. This product can be efficiently evaluated through the use of
Re´dei rational functions. We then exploit the isomorphism to construct
a novel RSA-like scheme. We compare our scheme with classic RSA
and with RSA-like schemes based on the cubic or conic equation. The
decryption operation of the proposed scheme turns to be two times
faster than RSA, and involves the lowest number of modular inversions
with respect to other RSA-like schemes based on curves. Our solution
offers the same security as RSA in a one-to-one communication and
more security in broadcast applications.
Keywords: Re´dei function, RSA, public cryptography
1 Introduction
RSA cryptosystem security is based on the existence of an one-way trapdoor
function [GB96], [Yao82], which is easy to compute and difficult to invert
without knowing some information, i.e., the trapdoor. Consider N = pq,
where p and q are two primes of roughly the same size, and e an invert-
ible element in Zφ(N) (φ(N) Euler totient function). Given the function
τN,e(x) = x
e (mod N), it is not known if there exists a probabilistic poly-
nomial time algorithm in N which can invert τ , for any x ∈ Z∗N , without
knowing either p, q, φ(N) or the inverse d of e in Zφ(N). Thus the pair (N, e),
called the public key, is known to anyone, while the triple (p, q, d), called
the secret key, is only known to the receiver of an encrypted message. The
ciphertext C is obtained as C =M e (mod N), and the original message M
is obtained with the exponentiation M = Cd (mod N).
Factoring N is the most common tried way for breaking RSA. Some
attacks are possible when either the private exponent d is small [Wie90], or
the public exponent e is small [CFPR96], [Cop97]. Several other methods,
which exploit extra information leaked by erroneous implementations of the
cryptosystem, exist (e.g., see [LHA+12]).
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Beside one-to-one communication scenario, there also exist other cryp-
tographic scenarios, such as broadcast applications, where RSA leaks addi-
tional vulnerabilities (e.g., see [Has86]).
RSA-like schemes (e.g., see [KMOV92], [Koy95], [Pad06]) have been pro-
posed in order to avoid some of these attacks. Some of these schemes turn
to have also a faster decryption procedure. They are based on isomorphism
between two groups, one of which is the set of points over a curve, usually
a cubic or a conic.
In this work we present an improvement of such schemes. We provide a
new RSA-like scheme based on isomorphism over a conic, with the fastest
isomorphism with respect to the ones known by the authors. Furthermore,
our scheme uses a different set of conics with respect to that of [Pad06],
which owns the fastest decryption procedure. We provide security proofs
and efficiency comparisons.
In Section 2 we give an overview of the use of conic equations in cryp-
tography and we introduce RSA-like schemes based on isomorphism. In
Section 3 we introduce a parametrization of certain conics and we intro-
duce the isomorphism used for the cryptographic scheme. In Section 4 we
describe our scheme, highlighting connections with Re´dei rational functions
and differences with other schemes based on the Pell equation and Dickson
polynomials. In Section 5 we discuss security issues. We prove that our
scheme is as secure as RSA in an one-to-one communication scenario, while
it is more secure in a broadcast scenario. We also show that our scheme is
secure against partially known-plaintext attacks. Finally, in Section 6 we
expose some efficiency considerations and comparisons with special focus on
the decryption procedure, where our scheme presents the lowest computa-
tional complexity if compared to all known similar schemes.
2 Related works
In this section we provide a quick overview of the use of conic equations
to construct cryptographic protocols. Then we define a generic RSA-like
scheme based on an isomorphism between two groups.
2.1 The use of conic equations in cryptography
The use of conic equations is not novel in cryptography, in particular to
build RSA-like cryptosystems.
In [Lem06] the Pell analogous of RSA protocol, Diffie-Hellman key-exchange,
and computing square roots modulo n, is presented. Specifically, as far as
it concerns RSA, it is noticed that where RSA sends one encrypted message
C about the size of N , the Pell version has to send twice as many bits per
message, without having increased the security of the system.
In [GS99] RSA, Rabin and ElGamal variants of Pell’s equation are presented
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proving that the proposed solutions are as secure as the original schemes.
The proposed schemes are claimed to have also the same asymptotic com-
plexity as the original schemes.
Three RSA-like schemes based on Pell’s equation are presented in [Pad06].
All three schemes have a faster decryption procedure than RSA. The first
two schemes are proved to be as secure as RSA in a one-to-one communica-
tion scenario and more secure in a broadcast scenario since they increase the
complexity of some low exponent attacks such as [Has86]. The third scheme
is the Pell analogous of [ST02] scheme. It is proved to be semantically secure
(recall RSA is not) and it is derived by randomizing the second scheme in a
standard way described in [ST02].
An implementation of Scheme II of [Pad06] is analyzed in [SA11]. The
scheme is implemented using GMP library [Gt12], and compared in its fa-
vor against a RSA implementation using the same library [BBB03].
The use of Re´dei rational function for a cryptographic scheme is introduced
in [KK12]. Though, the two schemes are inefficients with respect to RSA,
since a larger modulo (O(n2) instead of O(n)) is used for the public expo-
nent, and no isomorphism is exploited, making both encryption and decryp-
tion slower than RSA.
In [SV13] the advantages of key generation of a cryptosystem based on Pell’s
equation versus standard RSA (and some variants) key generation are dis-
cussed. The authors claim their key generation prevents Wiener attacks
[Wie90].
A symmetric cryptographic scheme based on the Brahmagupta-Bha˜skara
equation has been proposed in [MS06], attacked in [You07], corrected in the
author’s replay, and re-attacked in [AEM08] with a known-plaintext attack.
A combination of Arnold Cat Map, Chaotic Map, and Brahmagupta-Bha˜skara
equation has also been used to build cryptosystems for image encryption and
decryption (e.g., see [RG11], [TJ13]).
Based on Pell’s equation, in [RABS13], a claimed Identity-Based Encryp-
tion scheme is presented. The efficiency of its implementation using GMP
library [Gt12] is analyzed in [RAL15].
Also a Dynamic Threshold Multi Secret Sharing scheme [RSAB13] and a
Signature scheme [Mis14] have been recently published.
Other RSA type cryptosystems based on elliptic curves exist, such as [Koy95],
[KMOV92], and [Dem94]. These schemes have a computationally more ex-
pansive addition operation compared to schemes based on Pell’s equation,
such as [Pad06].
2.2 RSA-like schemes based on isomorphism
In the following we use multiplicative notation for groups. In particular, for
a group G with operation ⊙G and an element G ∈ G, we use the following
3
MC
M ′
C ′
Φ
Φ−1
C =M⊙Ge
M ′ = C ′⊙G′d
(G,⊙G) (G′,⊙G′)
Encryption/Decryption
C ′ =M ′⊙G′e
Figure 1: RSA-like scheme based on isomorphism.
notation for the exponentiation with respect to the group operation
G⊙Gx = G⊙G . . . ⊙G G︸ ︷︷ ︸
x times
.
In [Koy95], the concept of RSA-type schemes based on the isomorphism
between two groups has been introduced in order to have a faster decryption
with respect to the original RSA scheme. Such a scheme can be obtained
by finding an efficiently computable isomorphism
Φ : (G,⊙G)→ (G′,⊙G′)
between two groups, in such a way that, in the decryption procedure, the
use of the exponentiation in G′ and the inverse of the isomorphism is more
efficient than just applying the exponentiation in G. The scheme is visualized
in Figure 2.2. The message M is encrypted into the ciphertext C ′, either
by first applying the exponentiation in G and then the isomorphism, or
by first applying the isomorphism and then the exponentiation in G′. The
decryption follows the inverse process.
Usually G is the set of points of a curve over the ring ZN provided with
a group law, N the product of two primes, and G′ is a subgroup of Z∗N .
The first proposed curve in [Koy95] was a singular cubic curve, while a
particular set of conics was proposed in [Pad06] providing a more efficient
isomorphism inverse. In our work we propose another set of conics and we
consider G′ = Z∗N provided with a non-standard group law, yielding a more
efficient isomorphism inverse.
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3 Product of points over conics
In this section, we use an irreducible polynomial of degree 2 to define a
quotient field that induces a product over certain conics. This product gives
a group structure to the conics. Then, we introduce a parametrization that
allows us to define a bijection between a conic and a set of parameters,
yielding a group structure on this set. Finally, we determine the order of
this group. In Section 4 we use the bijection, which turns out to be an
isomorphism, to construct our RSA-like scheme.
3.1 A group structure over conic curves
Conics are the most simple non-linear curves and the Pell hyperbola defined
by
H = {(x, y) ∈ R× R : x2 −Dy2 = 1},
where D is a given positive integer (non-square), is one of the most popular,
since it contains all the solutions of the famous Pell equation. A group
structure can be defined over the Pell hyperbola by means of the following
product between points in H:
(x1, y1) · (x2, y2) = (x1x2 +Dy1y2, y1x2 + x1y2),
see, e.g., [VY] and [JWTD09].
Let K be an ordinary field, the previous product can be generalized in
order to provide a group structure over the conics
CK = {(x, y) ∈ K×K : x2 +Hxy −Dy2 = 1}.
When clear from the context we write C instead of CK, omitting the subscript.
Let x2−Hx−D be an irreducible polynomial over K[x] and let us consider
the quotient field
A = K[x]/(x2 −Hx−D).
Given p+ qx and r + sx in A, the induced product is
(p+ qx)(r + sx) = (pr + qsD) + (qr + ps+ qsH)x .
We now want to define the conjugate over A of an element p+qx with respect
to K. Notice that A is an extension of degree 2 over K and so the minimal
polynomial of p + qx over K has degree 2. Thus, we are looking for an
element r+sx such that the sum and the product between this element and
its conjugate p+ qx is in K. It is immediate to see that s = −q. Moreover,
since
(p+ qx)(r − qx) = (pr − q2D) + (rq − pq − q2H)x
5
we obtain that r = p+ qH. Thus, the conjugate p+ qx of an element p+ qx
is (p+ qH)− qx. Then, the norm of p+ qx over K is given by the product
of the conjugates of p+ qx, which is
(p+ qx)(p+ qx) = p2 +Hpq −Dq2 .
The group of unitary elements of A∗ = A− {0} is
U = {p+ qx ∈ A∗ : p2 +Hpq −Dq2 = 1}.
Consequently, there is a bijection between U and the conic C which deter-
mines a commutative group structure over the conic by means of the product
(x, y)⊙C (u, v) = (xu+ yvD, yu+ xv + yvH), ∀(x, y), (u, v) ∈ C. (1)
Proposition 1. (C,⊙C) is a commutative group with identity (1, 0) and the
inverse of an element (x, y) is (x+Hy,−y).
3.2 A group structure on the set of parameters
We can use the following parametrization for the conic C:
y =
1
m
(x+ 1).
Definition 1. Let us define the set of parameters PK = K ∪ {α}, with α
not in K. From the parametrization we can derive the following bijection
between C and PK:
ΦH,D :


C → PK
(x, y) 7→ 1 + x
y
∀(x, y) ∈ C, y 6= 0
(1, 0) 7→ α
(−1, 0) 7→ −H
2
,
(2)
and
Φ−1H,D :


PK → C
m 7→
(
m2 +D
m2 +Hm−D ,
2m+H
m2 +Hm−D
)
∀m ∈ K
α 7→ (1, 0) ,
. (3)
For the seek of simplicity, we only write Φ when there is no confusion.
This bijection allows us to derive from ⊙C the following product over the
set of parameters PK:
a⊙PK b =
D + ab
H + a+ b
, a+ b 6= −H
a⊙PK b = α, a+ b = −H
. (4)
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Proposition 2. (PK,⊙PK) is a commutative group with identity α and the
inverse of an element a is the element b such that a+ b = −H and Φ is an
isomorphism between C and PK.
The above parametrization of the conic C has been introduced in [BCM10a],
where the authors used it in order to study approximations of irrationalities
over conics. The commutative group (PK,⊙PK) can be also directly derived
from A∗ and it is possible to show that the quotient group B = A∗/K∗ and
PK are isomorphic [BCM10a].
Let us observe that when K = Zp, with p prime, A is a finite field with
p2 elements, i.e., it is the Galois field GF (p2). Moreover, B has order
(p2 − 1)/(p − 1) = p + 1 and consequently we have that PZp and CZp are
cyclic groups of order p+ 1.
Remark 1. Thus, an analogous of the Fermat little theorem holds in PZp
and CZp , i.e.,
m
⊙P
Zp
(p+2)
= m (mod p), ∀m ∈ PZp
and
(x, y)
⊙C
Zp
(p+2)
= (x, y) (mod p), ∀(x, y) ∈ CZp ,
where powers are performed using products ⊙PZp and ⊙CZp , respectively.
4 A public-key cryptosystem
In this section we develop a RSA-like scheme exploiting the properties of
the product ⊙PZp and the isomorphism Φ redefined to make sense also when
the conic is considered over the ring ZN . In particular, we will exploit the
fact that an analogous of the Fermat little theorem holds in PZp . Moreover,
we see that powers with respect to this product can be evaluated in a fast
way and the decryption operation in our scheme involves only one modular
inverse, by means of the definition of Φ.
4.1 Preliminaries
In order to insert a trapdoor in our scheme we would like to extend the ideas
of Section 3 to hold for the conic
HZN = {(x, y) ∈ ZN × ZN : x2 −Dy2 = 1 (mod N)} .
where ±D ∈ Z∗N are quadratic non-residues modulo N and N = pq with p, q
prime numbers. The condition on D will ensure the isomorphism inverse to
be well defined. The condition on −D will ensure the powers with respect
to ⊙PZN to be well defined. To lighten the notation, in the remainder of
the paper we omit the subscript ZN from HZN and PZN where there is no
ambiguity.
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Thus, we are working on a conic C where H = 0 and K = ZN . Since
ZN is not a field we need to refine some of the definitions. In particular,
in this case, the map Φ0,D : H → P of Definition 1 is not an isomorphism.
However, considering
H∗ = {(x, y) ∈ ZN × Z∗N : x2 −Dy2 = 1 (mod N)}
we have that |H∗| = |Z∗N | as proved in the following proposition. From now
on we also omit the subscripts 0,D from Φ0,D.
Proposition 3. With the above notation, we have that
1. ∀(x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ H∗, Φ(x1, y1) = Φ(x2, y2)⇔ (x1, y1) = (x2, y2);
2. ∀m1,m2 ∈ Z∗N , Φ−1(m1) = Φ−1(m2)⇔ m1 = m2;
3. ∀m ∈ Z∗N , we have Φ−1(m) ∈ H∗ and ∀(x, y) ∈ H∗, we have Φ(x, y) ∈
Z
∗
N .
Proof. 1. We have that
Φ(x1, y1) = Φ(x2, y2)⇔ (1 + x1)y2 = (1 + x2)y1.
Squaring both members and multiplying them by D, we obtain
D(1 + x1)
2y22 = D(1 + x2)
2y21.
Since (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ H∗, we get
(1 + x1)
2(x22 − 1) = (1 + x2)2(x21 − 1)2
from which it is easy to prove that x1 = x2 and y1 = y2.
2. We have that
Φ−1(m1) = Φ−1(m2)⇔
(
m21 +D
m21 −D
,
2m1
m21 −D
)
=
(
m22 +D
m2 −D,
2m2
m22 −D
)
.
Direct calculations show that this equality holds only when m1 = m2.
3. Using the explicit forms of Φ and Φ−1 the proof is straightforward.
We recall the definition of ΦH,D with H = 0 where we consider it only
between H∗ and Z∗N .
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Definition 2. We consider the bijection Φ between H∗ and Z∗N as
Φ :


H∗ → Z∗N
(x, y) 7→ 1 + x
y
and its inverse
Φ−1 :


Z
∗
N →H∗
m 7→
(
m2 +D
m2 −D ,
2m
m2 −D
)
.
The products over H∗ and Z∗N still follow the same rules seen in the
previous section, i.e.,
(x1, y1)⊙H (x2, y2) = (x1x2 +Dy1y2, y1x2 + x1y2), ∀(x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ H .
and
a⊙P b =
D + ab
a+ b
, ∀a, b ∈ Z∗N , a+ b ∈ Z∗N .
As a consequence of Remark 1, given l = lcm(p + 1, q + 1) and r = 1
(mod l) we have
m⊙Pr = m (mod N), ∀m ∈ Z∗N
and
(x, y)⊙Hr = (x, y) (mod N), ∀(x, y) ∈ H∗N ,
where powers are performed using products ⊙P and ⊙H, respectively.
Remark 2. In [BCM10b] the authors prove that powers with respect to the
product ⊙P can be evaluated by the Re´dei rational functions [Re´d46]. These
functions arise from the development of (z +
√
D)n, where z is an integer
and D is a non-square positive integer. One can write
(z +
√
D)n = An(D, z) +Bn(D, z)
√
D,
where
An(D, z) =
[n/2]∑
k=0
(
n
2k
)
Dkzn−2k, Bn(D, z) =
[n/2]∑
k=0
(
n
2k + 1
)
dkzn−2k−1.
These polynomials can be also determined by
Mn =
(
An(D, z) DBn(d, z)
Bn(D, z) An(D, z)
)
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with
M =
(
z D
1 z
)
.
The Re´dei rational functions Qn(D, z) are defined by
Qn(D, z) =
An(D, z)
Bn(D, z)
, ∀n ≥ 1.
The powers with respect to the product ⊙P can be evaluated as follows:
z⊙Pn = z ⊙P ...⊙P z︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
= Qn(D, z).
In this way, the exponentiation in P can be performed efficiently. Indeed,
in [Mor95] the author exhibits an algorithm of complexity O(log2(n)) with
respect to addition, subtraction and multiplication to evaluate Re´dei rational
functions Qn(D, z) over a ring.
4.2 The scheme
In this section, we explicitly describe the key generation, the encryption and
the decryption algorithms. The following steps show the key generation:
• choose two prime numbers p, q and compute N = pq;
• choose an integer e such that gcd(e, lcm(p+ 1)(q + 1)) = 1.
The pair (N, e) is called the public or encryption key ;
• evaluate d = e−1 (mod lcm(p + 1)(q + 1)).
The triple (p, q, d) is called the secret or decryption key.
Now, let us consider the set
Z˜
∗
N =
{
m2 +D
m2 −D : ∀m,D ∈ Z
∗
N ,±D quadratic non-residues modulo N
}
.
Let us suppose that we want to encrypt two messages (Mx,My) ∈ Z˜∗N ×Z∗N .
The following steps describe the encryption algorithm:
• compute D = M
2
x − 1
M2y
(mod N), so that (Mx,My) ∈ H∗N ;
• compute M = Φ(Mx,My) =
Mx + 1
My
(mod N);
• compute the ciphertext C =M⊙Pe (mod N) = Qe(D,M) (mod N).
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Once (C,D) are sent to the receiver, the decryption algorithm is described
as follows:
• compute C⊙Pd (mod N) =M ;
• retrieve the plaintexts (Mx,My) by means of Φ−1, i.e.
(Mx,My) = Φ
−1(M) =
(
M2 +D
M2 −D,
2M
M2 −D
)
(mod N).
4.3 Some remarks
In the previous section, we have introduced an RSA-like scheme based on
the Pell equation. Our scheme has some important differences with respect
to other similar schemes.
First of all, we have considered Pell’s equation x2 − Dy2 = 1 in ZN ,
where D is not a quadratic residue, while in [Pad06] the author worked on
the complementary case, i.e., when D is a quadratic residue.
Moreover, we have used a particular parametrization which allowed us to
define an original product ⊙PZP connected to Re´dei rational functions. We
have seen that in this case an analogous of the Fermat little theorem holds,
i.e.,
m
⊙PZP p+2 = m (mod p), ∀m ∈ PZp , p prime,
when K is a finite field. For this reason, the decryption key is computed
modulo lcm(p+ 1)(q + 1), while in RSA schemes (and also in [Pad06]) it is
computed modulo lcm(p − 1)(q − 1). Furthermore, it is known that Re´dei
rational functions can be exploited for the construction of cryptographic
systems following the Dickson scheme (see, [Nob84] and [MN86]). However,
in these schemes the decryption key is computed modulo lcm(p2−1)(q2−1),
which is much less efficient.
Finally, in the previous section we have seen that we can send message pairs
in Z˜∗N×Z∗N . We can observe that also in other RSA-like schemes that exploit
the Pell equation we are not able to encrypt all message pairs in Z∗N × Z∗N .
In the next example we see a message pair that can be encrypted using our
scheme, but that can not be encrypted with the analogous scheme developed
in [Pad06].
Example 1. Let us consider p = 11, q = 13, and N = 143. We choose
e = 5 as the public exponent and consequently d = 5−1 (mod 168) = 101 is
the secret one.
Let us suppose that we want to send the message pair (Mx,My) =
(83, 135) ∈ Z˜∗N × Z∗N . We obtain D =
M2x − 1
Mx
(mod N) = 54 and M =
Φ(Mx,My) (mod N) = 61. Now we encrypt M evaluating
61⊙P5 (mod N) = 38.
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If we want to retrieve the original message we compute
38⊙P101 (mod N) = 61
and
Φ−1(61) (mod N) = (83, 135).
Example 2. If we try to use the scheme II in [Pad06] for encrypting the
message pair (Mx,My) = (83, 135) we have to compute
Z1 =MxMy (mod N) = 51, Z
−1
1 (mod N) = 129
and to solve the system{
X − aY = Z1 (mod N)
X + aY = Z−11 (mod N)
where Y =My and the unknowns are X and a. In this way, we get
X = 98, a = 11.
We can observe that in this case a is not invertible in ZN and consequently
we can not compute the value a−1 which is necessary for the decryption.
However, this is a very rare situation when N is large, and finding a non-
invertible element of ZN is equivalent to factorize N itself.
5 Security of the proposed scheme
In this section we first prove that our scheme offers the same security as RSA
in a one-to-one communication scenario. Then we provide evidence that our
scheme is secure against partially known plaintext attacks, and against some
attacks of which RSA is vulnerable in a broadcast scenario. We conclude
with a comment on semantic security.
5.1 Security reduction to RSA
We show, with a standard reduction argument, that breaking our scheme is
equivalent to breaking RSA scheme.
Theorem 1. The following sentences are equivalent
1. There exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A1 such that
for all C,D ∈ Z∗N , if C = Φ(Mx,My)⊙Pe and D = (M2x − 1)2/M2y
(mod N), then A1(C,D, e,N) = (Mx,My), where D quadratic non-
residue modulo N , (Mx,My) ∈ Z˜N × ZN .
2. There exists a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A2 such that for
all M ∈ Z∗N , if C =M e (mod N), then A2(C, e,N) =M .
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Proof. First assume 1 and prove 2.
Given C, e,N we want to compute M using A1.
Choose D random quadratic non-residue modulo N .
Compute (Mx,My) = A1(C,D, e,N).
Compute M = Φ(Mx,My) =
Mx + 1
My
(mod N).
Now assume 2 and prove 1.
Given C,D, e,N we want to compute (Mx,My) using A2.
Compute A2(C, e,N) =M .
Compute (Mx,My) = Φ
−1(M) =
(
M2 +D
M2 −D,
2M
M2 −D
)
(mod N).
This completes the proof.
5.2 Partially known plaintext attack
Consider the case where the attacker is provided with the one of the two
plaintext coordinates. Since D = M
2
x−1
M2y
(mod N), the attacker has to solve
the quadratic congruence M2x − DM2y − 1 = 0 (mod N) with respect to
either Mx or My. It is well known that computing square roots modulo a
composite integer N , when the square root exists, is equivalent to factoring
N itself.
5.3 Broadcast applications
As many other RSA-like schemes, such as [KMOV92], [Koy95], [Pad06],
our scheme is more secure than the original RSA scheme when considering
broadcast applications. In such a scenario the plaintextM is encrypted for r
receivers using the same public exponent e and different moduli Ni for each
receiver, with i = 1, . . . , r. In [Has86] it is shown that, even if the messages
are public linear combinations of each other, if r > e it is possible to recover
M by solving a set of r congruences of polynomials of degree e. However,
as shown for example in [KMOV92] and [Koy95], this kind of attacks fails
when the trapdoor function is not a simple monomial power as in RSA. This
allows the use of smaller exponents e even in broadcast scenarios.
5.4 Semantic security
Our scheme can be easily transformed into a semantically secure scheme us-
ing standard techniques which introduce randomness in the process of gen-
erating the ciphertext. An example of these techniques is given in [Pad06],
when transforming scheme II into scheme III.
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6 Efficiency comparison with RSA-like schemes
In this section we take into consideration the most efficient and secure pub-
lished RSA-like scheme based on Pell’s equation, i.e. [Pad06], and make a
comparison with our proposed scheme.
Recall that the isomorphism used in the schemes of [Pad06] is given by
Φ :
{
HN → Z∗N
(x, y) 7→ x−Dy (mod N)
while the isomorphism used in [Koy95], where E = {(x, y) ∈ Z∗N : y2+axy =
x3 (mod N)}, is
Φ :
{
E → Z∗N
(x, y) 7→ 1 + axy (mod N) = x
3
y2
(mod N)
Both inverses are provided in Table 1. In practice the public exponent
e is usually chosen small and with an efficient binary representation, i.e.
e = 22
i
+ 1, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Thus the exponentiation xe performed during the
encryption is usually much faster than xd, which is done during decryption.
For this reason our comparison concerns only decryption time.
Notice also that all three schemes in [Pad06] can only encrypt messages
of size 2 logN , and thus a fair comparison with RSA is done if considering
encryption messages of the same size (rather than logN -bit plaintext), which
means RSA exponentiation must be applied two times in parallel, both
during encryption and decryption.
In Table 1, we indicate with M the modular multiplication (including
squaring), with I the modular inverse and with EyG the modular exponenti-
ation xy in the group G. Notice that, by the observation in Remark 2, both
the operations Ed
ZN
and EdP can be performed in O(log2N) with respect to
addition, subtraction and multiplication.
In Table 1 we report the decryption costs of RSA, the first two schemes
of [Pad06], the second scheme of [Koy95], and our scheme.
RSA is the only scheme requiring two exponentiations. All other schemes
require one exponentiation and one application of the isomorphism inverse
([Pad06]-I requires also the application of the isomorphism). Notice that
our isomorphism has the lowest number of inversions, i.e. one, and only
one more multiplication than [Pad06]-II, yielding the fastest isomorphism
inverse.
7 Conclusions
We have presented an original RSA-like scheme based on an isomorphism
between a conic and the set Z∗N with a non-standard product. The scheme
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Decryption costs Ciphertext size Φ−1(x)
RSA 2Ed
ZN
2logN -
[Pad06]-I 1Ed
ZN
+3M+3I 3logN
(
x−1+x
2 ,
x−1−x
2
√
D
)
[Pad06]-II 1Ed
ZN
+2M+3I 2logN
(
x−1+x
2 ,
x−1−x
2
√
D
)
[Koy95]-II 1Ed
ZN
+6M+2I 2logN
(
a2x
(x−1)2 ,
a3x
(x−1)3
)
Our scheme 1EdP+3M+1I 2logN
(
x2+D
x2−D ,
2x
x2−D
)
Table 1: Comparison of decryption costs for a (2 logN)-bit plaintext.
is complementary to the fastest original RSA-like scheme based on conics,
and furthermore it has a faster isomorphism inverse operation. We have also
proved that our solution provides a two times faster decryption operation
than the original RSA scheme, while offering the same security in a one-to-
one communication and more security in broadcast applications.
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